Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism, using Mary's Room thought experiment, aims to show that knowledge of qualia cannot be physical and that epiphenomenal knowledge is possible. This paper argues that one of the two main objections to Jackson's argument—the objection to the second premise (that Mary learns something new about color upon leaving her black-and-white room)—is unsuccessful. The objection relies on Cartesian-Materialist philosophical foundations and a reductive physicalism. However, the second premise itself also rests on the same foundations, so it is equally vulnerable to criticism. Adopting an externalist understanding of qualia that avoids Cartesian-Materialist physicalism and reductionism would prevent Jackson's argument from posing a serious threat to physicalism.
This philosophical paper investigates whether the contemporary notion of qualia—subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience—corresponds to Henri Bergson's conception of the fundamental qualities of conscious states. Bergson argues that conscious states unfold in pure duration, free from spatial or quantitative attributes, each moment possessing new, unrepeatable qualities shaped by personal memory and creativity. The paper examines Bergson's thought experiment involving two characters, Paul and Pierre, concluding that Paul cannot know or experience Pierre's conscious states without becoming Pierre himself, illustrating the inaccessibility of subjective experience. The analysis demonstrates parallels between Bergson's philosophy and the contemporary qualia problem, suggesting Bergson's work offers theoretical depth useful for understanding, critiquing, and inspiring new approaches in philosophy of mind.