Görüngüsel Bilginin Fizikselliği ya da Qualia Kafada Değilse Fizikseldir
MetaZihin: Yapay Zeka ve Zihin Felsefesi Dergisi December 30, 2023 Emre Arda Erdenk
Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism, using Mary's Room thought experiment, aims to show that knowledge of qualia cannot be physical and that epiphenomenal knowledge is possible. This paper argues that one of the two main objections to Jackson's argument—the objection to the second premise (that Mary learns something new about color upon leaving her black-and-white room)—is unsuccessful. The objection relies on Cartesian-Materialist philosophical foundations and a reductive physicalism. However, the second premise itself also rests on the same foundations, so it is equally vulnerable to criticism. Adopting an externalist understanding of qualia that avoids Cartesian-Materialist physicalism and reductionism would prevent Jackson's argument from posing a serious threat to physicalism.