WIREs Cognitive Science
September 1, 2017
Ralf-Peter Behrendt
Commentary on: Faw M, Faw B. Neurotypical subjective experience is caused by a hippocampal simulation. WIREs Cogn Sci 2017, e1412. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1412This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Neuroscience > Anatomy
WIREs Cognitive Science
September 1, 2017
Matt Faw, Bill Faw
Reply to: Behrendt R‐P. Hippocampus as a wormhole: gateway to consciousness. WIREs Cogn Sci 2017, e1446. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1446.This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Neuroscience > Anatomy
WIREs Cognitive Science
March 1, 2014
Tim Bayne, Jakob Hohwy
In recent decades there has been a great deal of interest in global disorders of consciousness, such as the vegetative state, the minimally conscious state, and epileptic absence seizures. Global disorders of consciousness pose significant challenges to consciousness science in that the ordinary pretheoretical criteria for the ascription of consciousness are not easily applied in such contexts,...
WIREs Cognitive Science
2011
Hakwan Lau
AbstractI review the major contenders for the neural correlates of visual awareness. Different views of the neural correlates turn out to support different theories, such as the global workspace theory, local visual processing theories, and the higher‐order representation theory. Therefore, studying the neural correlates of consciousness may prove useful to theoretical development, although...
WIREs Cognitive Science
2010
Felipe De Brigard, Jesse Prinz
AbstractFor the past three decades there has been a substantial amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be something that it is like to experience a representational perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently questioned on the basis of some alleged...