ISSN 1939-5078
6 papers in the library · publishing 2010-2017
WIREs Cognitive Science September 1, 2017 Ralf-Peter Behrendt
Commentary on: Faw M, Faw B. Neurotypical subjective experience is caused by a hippocampal simulation. WIREs Cogn Sci 2017, e1412. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1412This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Neuroscience > Anatomy
WIREs Cognitive Science September 1, 2017 Matt Faw, Bill Faw
Reply to: Behrendt R‐P. Hippocampus as a wormhole: gateway to consciousness. WIREs Cogn Sci 2017, e1446. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1446.This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Neuroscience > Anatomy
WIREs Cognitive Science September 1, 2014 Marcello Costantini
Perceiving a body is a phenomenal experience completely different from experiencing a body as one's own body. Visual presentation of bodies or body parts recruits several occipitotemporal regions in the brain. Are these activations sufficient in order to change the phenomenal status of a body in one's own body? In this paper, I will review consolidated experimental evidence showing that the...
WIREs Cognitive Science March 1, 2014 Tim Bayne, Jakob Hohwy
In recent decades there has been a great deal of interest in global disorders of consciousness, such as the vegetative state, the minimally conscious state, and epileptic absence seizures. Global disorders of consciousness pose significant challenges to consciousness science in that the ordinary pretheoretical criteria for the ascription of consciousness are not easily applied in such contexts,...
WIREs Cognitive Science 2011 Hakwan Lau
AbstractI review the major contenders for the neural correlates of visual awareness. Different views of the neural correlates turn out to support different theories, such as the global workspace theory, local visual processing theories, and the higher‐order representation theory. Therefore, studying the neural correlates of consciousness may prove useful to theoretical development, although...
WIREs Cognitive Science 2010 Felipe De Brigard, Jesse J. Prinz
AbstractFor the past three decades there has been a substantial amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be something that it is like to experience a representational perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently questioned on the basis of some alleged...