What role do the emotions play in cognition?
Jason L. Megill
Consciousness & Emotion November 4, 2003 DOI: 10.1075/ce.4.1.06meg (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Higher Order Representational theories of consciousness are inadequate because they fail to account for selective attention, and proposes that emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention, an account the author says is consistent with Damasio's (1994) work and has implications for face recognition, Capgras' and Fregoli syndromes, the frame problem in A.I., and affective computing. |
Abstract
This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A.I., and the research program of affective computing.