Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2020
Kevin J Ryan, Shaun Gallagher
61 citations
Ecological psychology and enactivism both hold that much of cognition can be explained without invoking internal representations, focusing instead on the dynamic coupling between an agent and the world. Yet the brain clearly plays a role. This paper explores the concept of resonance as a non-representational alternative to the brain's traditional role as a representational organ. It reviews two historical approaches to resonance—representational and non-representational, dynamic—and applies them to a case study of standard tonal jazz performance. The authors propose that a non-representational resonance account, consistent with both ecological psychology and enactivism, offers a viable explanation for jazz performance and suggest future research on the brain as a resonant organ.
Frontiers in Psychology
September 21, 2017
Shaun Gallagher
59 citations
The author defends a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self against deflationary and eliminativist critiques. They argue that the phenomenological account is itself deflationary because it treats the sense of ownership as implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. Against eliminativism, the author cites empirical evidence supporting pre-reflective self-awareness, which underlies the sense of ownership. Finally, they respond to the claim that phenomenology lacks a positive account by showing how the sense of ownership functions within an enactivist, action-oriented view of embodied cognition.
Frontiers in Psychology
June 24, 2022
Alice Chirico, Marta Pizzolante, Alexandra Kitson et al.
58 citations
Transformative experience (TE) is studied across many disciplines, from philosophy to neurobiology and in domains from spirituality to education, yet no consistent definition exists. This work reviews models and theories of TE from different fields, extracts their main components, and examines redundancies and particularities across domains. It then proposes an integrated theoretical framework and a preliminary interdisciplinary operational definition of TE. This synthesis aims to organize current research and theories, offering a foundation for operationalizing TE and encouraging new interdisciplinary studies.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2013
Melanie G. Rosen
58 citations
Dream reports are often not accurate representations of experiences during sleep, according to the narrative fabrication thesis. The received view that dreams are experiences during sleep that are accurately reported upon waking is challenged. Dream reports are frequently confabulated due to poor memory, bizarre content, and cognitive deficits. Narratives can be altered between initial REM sleep awakenings and subsequent reports. Experiments show subjects rationalize strange elements, omitting supernatural or bizarre components in waking memories. Inaccuracies are worsened by rapid memory loss and inability to reality-test dream memories. Lucid dreams with higher cognitive functions may yield more accurate reports, but generally dream reports are less accurate than waking reports. The theory cannot be tested with current methods but may be in the future.
Frontiers in Psychology
March 5, 2021
Erica Kilius, Noor H. Abbas, Leela McKinnon et al.
56 citations
During the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown (March–July 2020), university students' dream content changed. Female students reported more nightmares than male students. Compared to pre-pandemic normative samples, women experienced more aggressive interactions in their dreams, including increased physical aggression. Dreams may reflect how the mind processes stressful realities and simulate hypothetical threats. These findings suggest that the pandemic lockdown period affected students' dream content, with women disproportionately impacted, which can help universities develop support programs addressing students' anxieties about social distancing.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2020
Harald Walach
55 citations
Ontology and epistemology are interdependent. The current materialist ontology in science, paired with an empiricist epistemology focused only on outer sense experience, is insufficient to explain consciousness or anomalous cognitions. Historically, medieval science included both inner (first-person) and outer (third-person) experience. The author proposes a complementarist dual aspect model where consciousness and matter are coprimary, not derivative. This entails a broader epistemology: contemplative practice can explore consciousness to understand the deep structure of the world, complementing outward-directed science. Such a contemplative science may aid theoretical intuition and ethics.
Frontiers in Psychology
March 31, 2023
Peter Sjöstedt-hughes
54 citations
Psychedelic-induced metaphysical experiences should be integrated and evaluated using metaphysics, not just mysticism. In psychedelic-assisted therapy, patients may benefit from an optional, additional schema and discussion of metaphysical options during the integrative phase. The proposed "Metaphysics Matrix" and a new Metaphysics Matrix Questionnaire (MMQ) can serve as tools for quantitative measurement of psychedelic experience in trials. Metaphysics is based on argument rather than pure revelation, unlike mysticism. This approach bridges reason-based philosophy and practical therapy, potentially fusing philosophy with practical science.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2020
Edward Baggs, Vicente Raja, Michael L. Anderson
52 citations
Within ecological and enactive cognitive science, skill learning is often viewed narrowly as bodily change over time or broadly as change in the animal–environment system. The authors argue for the broader view, rejecting the narrow one. They claim the proper unit of analysis is activity, not the body, and that learning involves establishing and adaptively organizing enabling constraints on that activity. Using examples of maintaining upright posture and walking, they show how environmental structures (e.g., furniture for support) play a constitutive role that changes over development. This extended approach unifies ecological and enactive theories and may ground a radically embodied account of higher cognition.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2014
Martin Dresler, Leandra Eibl, Christian Fischer et al.
52 citations
In frequent lucid dreamers, the experience of volition—the sense of control over one's actions—is similar during lucid dreaming and wakefulness, and both are significantly higher than during non-lucid dreaming. However, specific aspects differ: planning ability is strongest while awake, intention enactment is strongest during lucid dreaming, and self-determination is equally strong during wakefulness and lucid dreaming. These findings confirm that different higher-order aspects of consciousness, such as volition, are expressed differently across conscious states.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2013
Jayesh S. Pillai, Christian Schmidt, Simon Richir
52 citations
The sense of presence, originally studied in virtual reality as telepresence, is a puzzling cognitive phenomenon that now spans multiple disciplines. This paper argues that presence arises from an experience of an Evoked Reality (ER), an illusion of reality that triggers an Evoked Presence (EP) in the mind. A Three Pole Reality Model is proposed, with poles ranging from Dream Reality to Simulated Reality and Primary (Physical) Reality at the center. A Reality-Presence Map illustrates the relationship between ER and EP. The concept may have applications in studying presence and exploring the nature of reality itself.
Frontiers in Psychology
March 25, 2022
David S. Mathai, Victoria Mora, Albert Garcia‐romeu
51 citations
Ketamine, a dissociative drug used as an anesthetic since the 1970s, also shows promise for psychiatric applications, especially when combined with psychological interventions. A review of historical and modern approaches discusses the clinical relevance of ketamine's acute psychoactive effects and proposes a unique model for using esketamine with Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). The authors suggest considerations for advancing medication-assisted psychotherapy as a field.
Frontiers in Psychology
March 3, 2021
Kristian Moltke Martiny, Juan Toro, Simon Høffding
51 citations
A framework for phenomenological mixed methods is proposed, where phenomenology informs both qualitative (first-person, subjective) and quantitative (third-person, objective) data generation, analysis, and interpretation. The authors argue for mutual constraint and enlightenment between these approaches when studying consciousness. Drawing on mixed-methods research and existing examples, they present three cases studying complex social phenomena. A three-fold structure is developed: the phenomenological frame, phenomenologically informed data generation (tier one), and phenomenologically informed analysis and interpretation (tier two). The article maps possibilities, challenges, and common pitfalls for researchers combining phenomenology with qualitative and quantitative methods.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2014
Stephen J Cowley
51 citations
Language is symbiotic: its dynamics between agent and environment arise as linguistic embodiment is managed under verbal constraints, granting humans a unique form of phenomenal experience through co-action. Evidence from 750 ms of mother-daughter talk shows how parties attune using a dynamic field to co-embody speech with experience of wordings, which emerge in making and tracking phonetic gestures that mesh artifice, cultural products, and impersonal experience. Rather than processing verbal content in brains, linguistic symbiosis grants access to diachronic resources, redefining language as "activity in which wordings play a part."
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2021
Larissa Bartlett, Marie-Jeanne Buscot, Aidan Bindoff et al.
50 citations
In a large sample of adults from 130 countries, higher mindfulness was linked to lower perceived stress and slightly higher work engagement. Each standard deviation increase in mindfulness corresponded to a 0.52 standard deviation decrease in stress and a 0.06 standard deviation increase in engagement. After a six-week mindfulness MOOC, participants reported substantially higher mindfulness, reduced stress, and a small improvement in work engagement. The findings suggest mindfulness is a modifiable personal resource that may protect against stress and support engagement, and that online courses can deliver these benefits affordably to many people.
Frontiers in Psychology
May 14, 2020
Marco Colizzi, Mirella Ruggeri, Sagnik Bhattacharyya
50 citations
Evidence suggests a dose-response relationship between cannabis use and psychosis risk, driven by frequent use and high-potency cannabis with high delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC) concentration. Δ9-THC induces transient psychosis-like symptoms in healthy individuals, while low-potency varieties may be less harmful due to lower Δ9-THC and the presence of cannabidiol (CBD), which may mitigate Δ9-THC's detrimental effects. CBD may have protective and therapeutic properties for psychosis. Similar patterns emerge for cognition: Δ9-THC impairs cognition, while CBD prevents such effects and enhances cognition alone. Molecular evidence shows Δ9-THC acts as a partial agonist and CBD as an inverse agonist/antagonist at cannabinoid receptors, with opposite effects on brain function, explaining intoxicating and therapeutic effects.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2014
Marek Mcgann
49 citations
Embodied cognitive science often describes the mind as “world-involving,” yet the nature of the environment remains poorly specified. This paper argues that enactivists should ally with a dynamic form of ecological psychology, which offers the most explicit theory of the psychological environment. It explores the intersubjective, cultural character of human psychology and the challenges this poses for both enactivist and ecological approaches. The theory of behavior settings (Barker, 1968; Schoggen, 1989) is presented as a framework to address these challenges, yielding an outline of a radical embodied account of intersubjectivity and social activity.
Frontiers in Psychology
September 24, 2021
Martha Newson, Ragini Khurana, Freya Cazorla et al.
48 citations
Engaging in the '4Ds'—dance, drums, sleep deprivation, and drugs—at raves and illegal free parties is associated with personal transformation when the experience is awe-inspiring, particularly for people with open personalities. Without awe or a ritual context, the 4Ds are linked to a lack of personal growth or anomie. A structural equation model showed that personal transformation following awe-inspiring raves was associated with bonding to other ravers and prosocial behavior toward that group at a cost to self, but not with bonding to humanity. The findings suggest that the 4Ds in a ritualized environment can help build meaningful social bonds with positive behavioral outcomes.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2015
Tal D Ben-Soussan, Aviva Berkovich-Ohana, Claudia Piervincenzi et al.
48 citations
Four weeks of daily Quadrato Motor Training (QMT), a whole-body movement contemplative practice, increased cognitive flexibility and ideational fluency more than verbal or simple motor training alone. In a pilot longitudinal MRI study, gray matter volume and fractional anisotropy changes in several brain regions, including the cerebellum, correlated positively with cognitive flexibility scores. These preliminary results support a connection between motor practice and creativity, consistent with models integrating cognitive flexibility, embodiment, and the motor system.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2014
Daniel Erlacher, Melanie Schädlich, Tadas Stumbrys et al.
48 citations
Actions in lucid dreams take longer than the same actions in wakefulness, but only for motor tasks. Counting, a non-motor task, showed no time difference. In a sleep-laboratory experiment, lucid dreamers performed counting, walking, and a gymnastics routine while marking time intervals with eye movements. Walking and gymnastics required significantly more time in dreams than in waking, but the relative duration of each task remained proportional—no task was disproportionately longer. A more complex motor task did not increase the time delay. The findings suggest prolonged dream durations may stem from absent muscular feedback or slower neural processing during REM sleep.
Frontiers in Psychology
November 25, 2021
Brandon Weiss, Victoria Amalie Nygart, Lis Marie Pommerencke et al.
47 citations
In an online volunteer sample, naturalistic use of psychedelic compounds was associated with reductions in Neuroticism and increases in Agreeableness and perceived social connectedness over four weeks. These changes covaried, suggesting shared emotion-regulation processes. Preliminary evidence pointed to a specific decrease in critical and quarrelsome interpersonal style, a component of Agreeableness. Baseline levels of Neuroticism, perspective taking, and social connectedness tentatively amplified adaptive changes in those respective traits. Demographic characteristics, social setting, and acute subjective factors showed limited moderating effects. The findings suggest psychedelics might help address interpersonal aspects of personality pathology and loneliness.
Frontiers in Psychology
August 12, 2020
Patrizio Paoletti, Tal Dotan Ben-Soussan
47 citations
Focusing attention on silence can serve as a paradigm similar to sensory deprivation for studying consciousness without content. This hypothesis paper reviews influential models of consciousness and their views on the relationship between consciousness and its contents. After assessing strengths and weaknesses of current models, the authors propose an extension based on the Sphere Model of Consciousness (SMC), introducing new definitions for identification and self-awareness as states of consciousness. They compare Paoletti's theoretical model for self-development with other models, noting similarities and differences. The paper concludes by discussing how attentional focus on silence can be empirically tested.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2019
Todd E Feinberg, Jon Mallatt
47 citations
Consciousness cannot be explained solely by physics, chemistry, and biology, creating an "explanatory gap" between the physical brain and subjective experience. This paper deduces the living and neural features behind primary consciousness within a naturalistic biological framework, identifying vertebrates, arthropods, and cephalopod molluscs as taxa possessing these features. It reconstructs when consciousness first evolved and considers its adaptive value. The authors theorize that consciousness arises from all complex system features of life plus even more complex features of elaborate brains. They argue the explanatory gap persists because it stems from both life and diverse brains, requiring a complex, multifactorial account including consciousness's diversity, personal nature from embodied life, and unique neural features.
Frontiers in Psychology
June 1, 2021
Dongjiao An, Changwei Wei, Jing Wang et al.
46 citations
Repeated doses of intranasal ketamine produce a fast-acting antidepressant effect in people with major depressive disorder, including those with treatment-resistant depression. In a meta-analysis of six randomized controlled trials totaling 858 participants, depression scores on the Montgomery–Asberg Depression Rating Scale dropped by an average of 6 points at 2–4 hours, 10 points at 24 hours, and 4 points at 28 days. The likelihood of achieving remission was about 3.5 times higher at 24 hours and 1.7 times higher at 28 days compared with placebo. Transient dissociative symptoms and other mild side effects occurred, but no persistent psychosis or mood switches were reported.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2020
Tim Elmo Feiten
46 citations
A unified framework combining ecological psychology and enactivism could challenge the cognitivist paradigm, but a conceptual tension arises from ecological psychology's realism versus enactivism's constructivist view that organisms enact their own worlds. The biologist Jakob von Uexküll's concept of Umwelt, describing how an organism's sensory physiology shapes its experience, has been proposed as a bridge. However, critics argue Umwelt is steeped in representationalism, incompatible with radical embodied cognition. This paper distinguishes two uses of Umwelt—one emphasizing subjective experience, aligned with Uexküll's philosophical project, and another used in cognitive science debates—and shows how this distinction matters for reconciling ecological and enactive approaches, while providing critical background on Uexküll's compositional theory of meaning.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2010
Michiel van Elk, Marc Slors, Harold Bekkering
46 citations
The paper argues that criticisms of embodied cognition—such as whether sensorimotor brain activation is necessary for language comprehension and how we understand language for which we lack relevant experiences—stem from interpreting embodiment through a cognitivist lens. Instead, the authors propose an enactivist, non-representationalist model: language comprehension is procedural knowledge (knowing how, not knowing that) that enables interaction with others in a shared physical world. On this view, activation in modality-specific brain areas reflects the use of sensorimotor skills, and comprehension is context-bound. The enactivist approach thus supports an embodied view of language while avoiding the problems faced by cognitivist interpretations.