ISSN 2150-7740; 2150-7759;
5 papers in the library · 40 citations · publishing 2022-2023
AJOB Neurosci December 7, 2022 Joshua Shepherd 38 citations
Consciousness is often thought necessary for moral status, but this paper argues that this assumption is too uncertain to guide policy on non-human animals. Policies should consider that psychological traits independent of consciousness might be sufficient for moral status. The author illustrates practical consequences of questioning consciousness-based views.
AJOB Neurosci April 1, 2023 Kamil Mamak 1 citation
The paper argues that the phenomenology of phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, qualitative character of experience—carries moral weight when considering artificial agents. It contends that if an artificial agent possesses phenomenal consciousness, its experiences matter morally, and the nature of that consciousness influences how it should be treated. The work explores the philosophical implications of attributing consciousness to AI, suggesting that the presence or absence of subjective experience is a key factor in determining moral status. The authors do not assert that current AI systems are conscious but examine the theoretical conditions under which they might be, and what that would mean for ethical obligations.
AJOB Neurosci April 1, 2023 Adina L. Roskies 1 citation
Consciousness-based approaches to moral status are inadequate for guiding policy decisions concerning nonhumans, according to Shepherd (2023). The author argues that such approaches fail to provide a sufficient framework for determining how nonhumans should be treated in policy contexts, suggesting that alternative criteria are needed to address the moral status of nonhumans.
AJOB Neurosci April 1, 2023
This philosophical paper explores the relationship between moral relevance and the possibility of artificial consciousness. It examines whether artificial systems could ever possess the necessary attributes to be considered moral patients, entities that deserve moral consideration. The argument engages with theories of consciousness and moral status, questioning how we might determine if an AI system has subjective experience or interests that could ground moral obligations toward it. The paper does not reach a definitive conclusion but maps the conceptual terrain and highlights key philosophical challenges that must be addressed before we can responsibly attribute moral status to artificial beings.
AJOB Neurosci April 1, 2023
The paper argues that current privacy protections for mental data are inequitable because they fail to account for the extended mind thesis, which holds that mental processes can extend beyond the individual into external tools and environments. The author contends that people who rely more on external cognitive aids—such as those with disabilities or lower socioeconomic status—face greater privacy risks when their extended mental data is collected or shared. The work calls for privacy frameworks to recognize these disparities and protect all individuals' mental data equally, regardless of how their cognition is distributed.