ISSN 0929-0907
5 papers in the library · publishing 1993-2010
Pragmatics & Cognition December 31, 2010 Christopher Frith
In the first talk I discuss recent experiments designed to elucidate the neural correlates of consciousness. Implicit in this discussion are operational definitions of what I mean by consciousness. In the second talk I explore the extent to which we are conscious of being in control of our actions, our sense of agency. I raise the question of why we need to be aware of actions at all since we...
Pragmatics & Cognition December 31, 2010 Julian Kiverstein
InHow the Mind Uses the BrainRalph Ellis and Natika Newton develop a novel embodied, enactive theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness has its basis in neural systems that prepare the system to perform actions of emotional significance to the organism. Consciousness emerges out of self-organising processes which function in such a way as to contribute to, and maintain, the...
Pragmatics & Cognition December 31, 2010 Shaun Gallagher
I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I...
Pragmatics & Cognition December 4, 2009 Sune Vork Steffensen
After a brief summary of Andy Clark’s book, Supersizing the Mind (2008) I address Clark’s approach to language which I argue to be inadequate. Clark is criticized for reifying language, thus neglecting that it is an interpersonal activity, not a stable system of symbols. With a starting point in language as a social phenomenon, I suggest an ecological approach to the extended mind hypothesis,...
Pragmatics & Cognition 1993 Natika Newton
The sensorimotor theory of cognition holds that human cognition, along with that of other animals, is determined by sensorimotor structures rather than by uniquely human linguistic structures. The theory has been offered to explain the use of bodily terminology in nonphysical contexts, and to recognize the role of experienced embodiment in cognition. This paper defends a version of the theory...