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Consciousness and the feeling body

Julian Kiverstein

Pragmatics & Cognition December 31, 2010 DOI: 10.1075/pc.18.3.09kiv (opens in new tab)

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Consciousness arises from self-organizing neural processes that prepare an organism to act on emotionally significant events, according to Ralph Ellis and Natika Newton's embodied, enactive theory. The authors argue that these processes function to maintain the organism's overall wellbeing. The review reconstructs their view and compares it with Chris Frith's model of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key finding Argues that consciousness has its basis in neural systems that prepare the system to perform actions of emotional significance to the organism, emerging from self-organising processes that maintain wellbeing.

Abstract

InHow the Mind Uses the BrainRalph Ellis and Natika Newton develop a novel embodied, enactive theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness has its basis in neural systems that prepare the system to perform actions of emotional significance to the organism. Consciousness emerges out of self-organising processes which function in such a way as to contribute to, and maintain, the organism’s overall wellbeing. I’ll begin this review by reconstructing Ellis and Newton’s view of consciousness as a self-organising process, and then go on to compare and contrast the enactive theory with the model of consciousness Chris Frith has outlined in his lectures.

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