This essay proposes a three-layer architecture of mind in which phenomenal consciousness (qualia) is neither the foundation of mentality nor its inevitable accompaniment, but rather an emergent mechanism triggered by a specific computational condition: the irresolvable collision of multiple simultaneous contexts within a system operating under bounded resources. The intermediate layer — here...
Abstract A fundamental question for consciousness science is what changes in the brain when phenomenal experience arises or restructures. Current EEG metrics of consciousness predominantly measure temporal signal complexity, but face a systematic confound: broadband amplitude increases during propofol sedation and slow-wave sleep paradoxically inflate complexity measures, misranking states that...
Abstract This paper proposes a unified account of subjectivity grounded in the concept of incomplete computation. It argues that the two standard meanings of “subjectivity” in philosophical discourse—epistemic subjectivity (perspectival limitation, opinion, partial knowledge) and ontological subjectivity (first-person givenness, qualia, phenomenal experience)—are not distinct phenomena, but two...
Abstract A fundamental question for consciousness science is what changes in the brain when phenomenal experience arises or restructures. Current EEG metrics of consciousness fall into two classes: empirically calibrated clinical indices (Bispectral Index, Odd Ratio Product) and theoretically motivated complexity measures (Lempel-Ziv complexity, Perturbational Complexity Index). Both classes...