4 papers in the library · publishing 2026
March 11, 2026 Aaron Kagan, Charles Lassiter
In the previous chapter, we looked at weak embodied cognition and reasons in favor of it. In this chapter, we consider reasons against weak embodied cognition. The criticisms can be lumped into three categories: weak embodied cognition inherits problems with representationalism, weak embodied cognition is not radical enough, and weak embodied cognition is too radical.
March 11, 2026 Aaron Kagan, Charles Lassiter
Weak embodied cognition is characterized by commitment to some machinery of disembodiment, namely, representations. This is done by separating the structure and content of representations. A representation&s;s structure reflects a sense modality (e.g., sight, smell) and thereby shapes how that representation is processed. A representational account of embodiment allows for smooth integration...
March 11, 2026 Aaron Kagan, Charles Lassiter
Strong embodied cognition rethinks what cognition looks like. It gets rid of mental representations and other internal entities. As a result, it locates information for cognition in the world around us. We are sensitive and respond to that externally located information as part of thinking and acting. As a result, the divisions between perception, cognition, and action become fuzzy.
March 11, 2026 Aaron Kagan, Charles Lassiter
The parity principle is central to EM. If certain functions happen “in the head,” we have no problem calling them cognitive. But what&s;s so sacred about their occurring in the head? If a function happens outside the head, why not also call it cognitive? We explore the parity principle in greater detail and use it to expand what counts as part of the cognitive system.