The Relation Between Transcendental I and Time in Kant's Thought
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī April 28, 2024 Nayerehsadat Mirmousa
Kant's transcendental self is the ground of temporal synthesis yet is itself outside time. This article argues that the transcendental self is not disconnected from time; rather, it is always "with" time. Time is the way the subject affects itself, making objectivity and synthetic a priori knowledge possible. The transcendental self, as pure spontaneity, constitutes objectivity through time, giving time to itself a priori. This constant companionship with time resolves the apparent contradiction: the transcendental self is not "in" time but "with" time, enabling all modes of time (persistence, succession, simultaneity) and guaranteeing the subject's transcendence through its finitude.