Why pretense poses a problem for 4E cognition (and how to move forward)
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences December 1, 2022 Peter Langland-Hassan
Whether someone is pretending depends on their beliefs and intentions, which creates a problem for 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) accounts of pretense that typically try to explain psychological phenomena without invoking such internal cognitive states. The article examines tensions within three recent 4E theories of imagination and pretense, then proposes a path forward that allows explanations to include beliefs and intentions while remaining consistent with 4E principles. To genuinely explain pretense, 4E theorists must accept that two agents with identical short-term outward behaviors and environments may be guided by different beliefs and intentions, making only one of them a pretender. The scientific explanation of pretense thus remains tied to the broader project of determining which beliefs and intentions to ascribe to which entities based on their behaviors.