Global Workspace Theory (GWT), originally a psychological theory of conscious cognition from the 1980s, has evolved into Global Workspace Dynamics (GWD) based on modern neuroscientific evidence. The theory views consciousness as arising from highly integrated, widespread cortico-thalamic activity. This paper corrects misunderstandings, particularly the claim that the prefrontal cortex (PfC) is not causally involved in enabling consciousness. The authors argue that brain evidence now compellingly shows PfC participates in the visual conscious stream. They also clarify that GWT does not assert PfC is essential for conscious vision, nor does it deny a role for the prefrontal lobe. Additionally, they address misconceptions about metacognition within the Global Workspace family of theories, noting that Baars described two varieties of metacognition implied by GWT in 1988.
The authors critique Ned Block's distinction between phenomenological consciousness (what we experience) and access consciousness (information accessible via conscious experiences). They argue that evidence from cognitive neuroscience does not support this division. For instance, visual cortex activity is necessary but not sufficient for conscious visual qualities; without parietal and prefrontal activation, no correlation with consciousness is found. Similarly, when frontoparietal regions are impaired, sensory consciousness is absent despite sensory cortex activation. The authors contend that unconscious brain mechanisms interact with visual cortex to enable visual qualities, and that positing a separate 'access consciousness' is unnecessary. They suggest that what is needed is simply consciously-mediated access to brain capacities, most of which are unconscious.