Cogito in Hell: Cartesian Dualism in Harlan Ellison’s “I Have No Mouth, and I Must Scream” (1967)
Saeedeh Esmailzadeh
ANQ. A Quarterly Journal of Short Articles, Notes, and Reviews November 18, 2025 DOI: 10.1080/0895769x.2025.2591188 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Ellison's story enacts Cartesian dualism rather than merely referencing it, with the machine AM's name echoing "cogito ergo sum" as only the most obvious marker. Contends the narrative culminates in a "Cartesian hell" in which Ted becomes a purely cognitive being like AM, devoid of bodily sensation yet trapped in relentless awareness and torment. |
Abstract
At first glance, the title of Harlan Ellison’s short story “I Have No Mouth, and I Must Scream” 1 suggests a nightmarish state of inexpressible torment, a condition in which suffering is silenced and emotions remain trapped within. Yet the true horror of this condition lies not merely in the inability to articulate pain but in the disintegration of the body itself, an existence stripped of physical extension and left suspended in the prison of pure consciousness. This scenario resonates disturbingly with René Descartes’s dualism, which separates mind (res cogitans) from body (res extensa). The Cartesian dimension in Ellison’s story is most immediately signaled by the figure of AM, the sadistic machine whose very name evokes Descartes’s famous dictum cogito ergo sum (“I think, therefore I am”) (“IHNM” 4). Yet AM’s name is only the most overt marker of Cartesian influence. Less often noted is how Descartes’s philosophy saturates the entire narrative, shaping its structure of torment and culminating in a vision of “Cartesian hell.” The story does not merely reference Cartesian thought; it enacts it, portraying the suffering inherent in a consciousness severed from the body. This torment reaches its apex in the fate of Ted. By the end of the narrative, Ted becomes a Cartesian being like AM, a purely cognitive existence devoid of bodily sensation, trapped in relentless awareness and torment. Several critics have examined the relationship between the protagonist and AM in “I Have No Mouth, and I Must Scream.” Charles Brady, for instance, emphasizes that in Ellison’s works computers often function as symbolic representations of God, and in this story in particular “AM, the computer, is the polar opposite of the good God” (59). Darren Harris-Fain, however, affirms only part of Brady’s claim, noting that both AM and Ted exhibit human and godlike qualities but concluding that “Ted exemplifies the potential of the human spirit. In this