«Aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists»
Luca Zanetti
Lebenswelt. Aesthetics and philosophy of experience. February 13, 2026 DOI: 10.54103/2240-9599/30805 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that, for the early Wittgenstein, the fundamental source of aesthetic experience lies in wonder at the inexplicable existence of the world, and that a reconstructed phenomenology connecting the experience of existence with aesthetic experience explains the nexus between the view 'sub specie aeternitatis', aesthetics, and wonder, sheds light on the 'Engelmann remark', and makes Wittgenstein's early aesthetics plausible by illuminating examples such as the experience of the stove and Murdoch's hovering kestrel. |
Abstract
This paper offers an interpretation of the reflections Wittgenstein wrote up to 1930 on aesthetics and the experience of wonder at the existence of the world. I argue that, for the early Wittgenstein, the fundamental source of aesthetic experience lies in a sense of wonder at the inexplicable existence of the world. Drawing on his scattered remarks on this issue, I reconstruct a sketch of a phenomenology that connects the experience of existence with aesthetic experience. From an exegetical perspective, the main contributions of this paper are threefold: first, it provides an explanation of the otherwise puzzling nexus Wittgenstein draws between the view sub specie aeternitatis, aesthetics, and the experience of wonder at the existence of the world; second, it relies on this explanation in order to shed light on his so-called ‘Engelmann remark’; and third, it offers reasons to consider Wittgenstein’s early view on aesthetics as plausible, by showing how it can illuminate a range of aesthetic experiences, both in Wittgenstein’s own writings (e.g., the experience of the stove) and in those of other authors (e.g., Murdoch’s experience of the hovering kestrel).