Artificial Consciousness: Engineering Problem or Philosophical Illusion?

Abstract

The question of whether artificial consciousness can be engineered or whether it constitutes a fundamental philosophical illusion stands at the intersection of cognitive science, computer engineering, and analytic philosophy. This paper critically examines that question by analysing the theoretical foundations of consciousness — including subjective experience, qualia, and self-awareness — against the operational capabilities of contemporary artificial intelligence systems such as large language models (LLMs). The paper argues that while modern AI demonstrates sophisticated linguistic and reasoning behaviour, this behaviour emerges from statistical pattern recognition rather than phenomenal awareness. Drawing on the computational theory of mind, John Searle's Chinese Room Argument, David Chalmers's hard problem of consciousness, and Integrated Information Theory (IIT), the analysis reveals a deep tension between the engineering aspiration to replicate consciousness and the philosophical challenge of defining and verifying it. The paper concludes that artificial consciousness is neither trivially achievable nor categorically impossible, but that progress toward it requires resolving foundational philosophical problems that precede any engineering solution. Until a rigorous, empirically testable account of consciousness is established, claims of machine consciousness remain premature. The implications for AI development, machine rights, and the limits of computational modelling are examined throughout.