The Hard Problem Is Not a Bridge Between Two Substances, But the Formation of Internality: Structural Preconditions of Consciousness in Difference Monism
Yi Fu
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) April 28, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19858597 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Proposes that the hard problem of consciousness be reframed around what kind of structure develops an interior sufficient to host consciousness, defined by four threshold conditions: stable boundary, internal differentiability, folded-back inheritance, and subject-level integration. Argues for a falsifiable negative boundary claim that complete third-person translation cannot residuelessly substitute first-person access. |
Abstract
This paper reformulates the hard problem of consciousness within the framework of Difference Monism (DM). Rather than asking how physical processes bridge to subjective experience, it asks: what kind of structure develops internality sufficient to host consciousness? The paper identifies four threshold conditions (stable boundary, internal differentiability, folded-back inheritance, subject-level integration), distinguishes DM from IIT/GNW/illusionism, and establishes a falsifiable negative boundary claim: complete third-person translation cannot residuelessly substitute first-person access. English preprint.
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