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[Pain and its limits : A phenomenological consideration of chronic pain].

Judith N Wagner

Schmerz (Berlin, Germany) April 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s00482-023-00776-9 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Enactivism Lived body Merleau-ponty Transparency
Key points Proposes that chronic pain be characterized through a phenomenological and enactivist lens centered on the limits of the lived body, asking whether pain and perception of bodily boundaries reciprocally influence each other and whether modifying that perception could reduce suffering. Argues that neuroscience and philosophy are not competing sciences but inform each other.

Abstract

Chronic pain poses a significant global socio-medical challenge causing significant costs. It is only since the mid-20th century that pain syndromes have been considered diseases in their own right. According to the definition of the International Association for the Study of Pain, pain is a complex, context-dependent-and hence modifiable-phenomenon. The philosophical view on pain is no less multi-facetted and allows for a wide range of viewpoints. This analysis aims at a characterisation of pain including a-mainly phenomenological and enactivist-philosophical perspective. The discourse will be guided by the concept of the limit(s) of the lived body: what is the relationship between pain and the perception of the lived body's boundaries? Does a reciprocal influence exist? And may the perception be modified in order to reduce the patient's suffering? These musings will also clarify that neurosciences and philosophy are not competing sciences, but rather inform each other.

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