The Dynamic Subject: Minimal Self, Narrative Self, and the Transition from Action to Reflection
Ilya Tarasov
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) March 23, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19183074 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that selfhood has two distinct forms: a minimal, pre-reflective first-person character operative in perception and action, and a narrative selfhood that organizes experience explicitly and temporally in reflection. The author proposes that reflection is a later organization of selfhood and that the transition between action and reflection is central to understanding how one subjectivity supports both modes. |
Abstract
Ordinary action and explicit reflection organize selfhood differently. In action, experience is lived from within rather than approached as an object of observation. In reflection, action can be evaluated, narrated, and integrated into autobiographical understanding. The central question is how a single subjectivity supports both modes. Minimal selfhood names the pre-reflective first-personal character of experience operative in perception and action. Narrative selfhood names the explicit and temporally extended organization of selfhood in reflection. The argument distinguishes these forms and explains the transition between them. Drawing on phenomenology, motor control and agency research, metacognition, large-scale neural organization, bodily self-consciousness, source and reality monitoring, and clinical dissociation, it treats reflection as a later organization of selfhood and places the transition between action and reflection at the center of the theory.