Theory of Dynamic Subject: Minimal Self, Narrative Self, Action Mode, and Reflection Mode
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) April 23, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19708004 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA theory proposes that the single term 'self' actually covers several distinct processes: embodied first-person presence, autobiographical self-organization, explicit self-evaluation, and metacognitive monitoring. The theory introduces two levels of self—minimal and narrative—along with two modes of functioning—action and reflection—and the transitional dynamics between them. The minimal self organizes current first-person experience through body-oriented brain systems, while the narrative self integrates experience into autobiographical memory and self-knowledge via default-mode, hippocampal, and prefrontal systems. The action mode handles current environmental interaction, and the reflection mode involves explicit self-related processing. The theory expects distinct clinical destabilization patterns and requires validation at neural, behavioral, and clinical levels.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Embodied cognition Action physics Reflection computer programming Narrative Object grammar |
| Key finding | Proposes that the self comprises separable components—minimal and narrative selves, action and reflection modes—with distinct neural correlates, requiring validation through partial differentiability at neural, behavioral, and clinical levels. |
Abstract
Research on the self often uses a single term—'self'—to denote several disparate processes that differ in function, timescale, and neural organization: embodied first-person presence, autobiographical self-organization, explicit self-evaluation, and metacognitive monitoring. For their separate analysis, the theory introduces two levels of self—minimal and narrative—two modes of functioning—action and reflection—and the transitional dynamics between them as a separate parameter of coordination. The minimal self defines the bodily-perspectival organization of current first-person experience and is associated with a distributed system of body-oriented processing, including the anterior precuneus, posteromedial regions, insula, and temporo-parietal systems. The narrative self defines the integration of current experience into autobiographical memory, personal continuity, and explicit self-knowledge and is associated with the coordinated involvement of default-mode, hippocampal, and prefrontal systems. The action mode corresponds to the organization of processing around current interaction with the environment; the reflection mode corresponds to states in which current or retrieved content becomes the object of explicit self-related and metacognitive processing. The theory posits expected clinical profiles as preferential, but not fully isolated, patterns of destabilization. Its validation requires establishing the partial differentiability of these components at the neural, behavioral, and clinical levels.