Integrating Brain, Consciousness, and Mind: A Naturalistic Emergentist Dual-Aspect View
Gil Santos
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 2027 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-41569-1_2 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the mind consists of the brain's first-person meaning-making activities, distinct from third-person causal and spatial brain attributes, and that conflating these frameworks produces category mistakes in concepts such as mental causation, representation, and information. Contends against an 'unconscious mind', proposing instead that mind is the inner structure of first-person consciousness, and that neurobiological research supports consciousness as a relational-transformational process of ontological emergence. |
Abstract
Abstract: In this article, I develop a naturalistic emergentist dual-aspect framework to address the relationships among the human mind, consciousness, and the brain. I begin by arguing that the mind consists of the brain’s first-person, meaning-making activities, which underlie—and thereby unify—all semantic, semiotic, logical, and mathematical operations and constructs. This characterization allows for a clear distinction between the mind and the purely third-person causal, spatial, and temporal attributes of brain states and processes. I contend that failing to distinguish between these two perspective-based categorial frameworks inevitably leads to category mistakes. My critique focuses on the concepts of mental causation, representation, and information. Next, I argue against the notion of an ‘unconscious mind’. Instead, I contend that the mind constitutes the very inner structure of the brain’s first-person consciousness. Finally, I argue that neurobiological research provides an empirical basis for understanding human consciousness—and, by extension, the mind—as the result of a relational-transformational process of ontological emergence within the brain.
Citations in the library
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