Intentionality and the Non-Psychological
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research June 1, 1986 DOI: 10.2307/2107668 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 132 |
| Key points | Argues that prevailing accounts of intentionality, including Lycan's and Searle's, fail to distinguish intentional mental states from non-intentional dispositional physical states, and that accepting these accounts leads to panpsychism. Contends that this failure has compromised much recent work on intentionality and that future work must clearly make the distinction. |
Abstract
We will show that the most typical characterizations' of intentionality, including those discussed by W. Lycan in his article On 'Intentionality' and the Psychological,' and also Lycan's own suggested characterization and John R. Searle's more extended treatments of the concept all fail to distinguish intentional mental states from non-intentional dispositional physical states. Accepting any of these current accounts will be to take a quick road to panpsychism! The cases and arguments we develop are not meant merely to show up errors and inadequacies but are meant to show in detail how the persistent and widespread failure to distinguish between intentionality and non-intentional causal dispositionality has compromised much recent work (including that of Searle's) on intentionality. The clear need to make such a distinction should provide a direction for future work on the subject.