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A reflexive thinking theory of consciousness

Peter Carruthers

Cambridge University Press eBooks February 23, 1996 DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511583360.009 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Proposes that consciousness is constituted by an accessibility relation to occurrent thinkings that are themselves reflexively available to further thinkings, and argues this "reflexive thinking" theory provides a better framework than Dennett's multiple drafts theory for understanding consciousness and the role of natural language in human cognition.

Abstract

In this chapter I shall present, elucidate, and defend my own proposal on the nature of consciousness, which I call the reflexive thinking (RT) theory . This theory will then be put to work in the chapter which follows, where I shall argue that human conscious thinking, at least, essentially involves public language. Since I claim that RT theory provides a better framework for considering the nature of consciousness than does Dennett's multiple drafts theory, I shall also maintain that the eventual result is a more plausible account of the role of natural language in human cognition than is Dennett's hypothesis of the ‘Joycean machine’. Reflexive thinking theory I propose that consciousness is constituted by an accessibility-relation to occurrent thinkings, where those thinkings are conscious in turn (that is, where they are regularly made available to further occurrent thinkings, which are, if they occur, in turn made available to yet further thinkings, and so on). Conscious experiences, in particular, are those which are available to acts of thinking which are reflexively available to further thinkings . Conscious occurrent thinkings – conscious acts of wondering-whether, judging-that, supposing-that, and the like – are those which are made available to further, indefinitely reflexive, thinking . And conscious (dormant) beliefs and desires are those which are apt to emerge as such reflexively available thinkings. Let me now work through some examples of each of these three categories of conscious state (namely, perception, occurrent thinking, and standing-state thought), by way of illustration.