Neurobiology of conscious experience.
T W Picton, D T Stuss
Current Opinion in Neurobiology April 1994 DOI: 10.1016/0959-4388(94)90082-5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes that conscious experience is the brain's internal model of incoming information rather than the information itself, that this modelling occurs in the neocortex and may relate to oscillatory field potentials, and that general disorders of consciousness stem from damage to areas that energize and direct modelling, while specific deficits stem from focal sensory or motor cortex lesions. |
Abstract
Recent research and theory suggest that conscious experience involves a modelling process. The human brain generates an internal model to fit incoming information about the external world, and experiences the model rather than the information. The modelling occurs at the level of the neocortex and may be associated with specific oscillatory field potentials. Imagining exercises the modelling system independently of sensory information. General disorders of consciousness are caused by damage to those areas of the brain that energize and direct the modelling process Specific deficits of consciousness are caused by focal lesions to sensory or motor cortex that prevent the modelling of particular input and output patterns.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 4
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