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The sensed presence as right hemispheric intrusions into the left hemispheric awareness of self: an illustrative case study.

M A Persinger, Y R Bureau, O P Peredery, P M Richards

Perceptual and Motor Skills June 1, 1994 DOI: 10.2466/pms.1994.78.3.999 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Case study Case report Peer reviewed
Sample size 1
Population A single woman with a history of electrical seizures and sensed presences
Keywords Neurons Humans Epilepsy, temporal lobe Tomography, x-ray computed Neurologic examination Delusions Awareness Consciousness Attention Dominance, cerebral Neuropsychological tests Synaptic transmission Adult Female
Key findings Argues that a woman's verified right temporal electrical anomalies and left temporoparietal atrophy, together with her reported sensed presences, ego-alien intrusions, and pre-seizure "sudden knowing," support the hypothesis of "vectorial hemisphericity." Contends that such processes require reevaluating "hysteria" as a default psychiatric explanation and question the belief that awareness during seizures or premonition of subsequent somatosensory experience contraindicates epilepsy.

Abstract

The hypothesis of vectorial hemisphericity predicts that left hemispheric intrusions of the right hemispheric equivalent of the sense of self should be associated with the experience of a "presence" of someone else. The neurophenomenological profile of a woman whose medical history satisfied these theoretical criteria (verified electrical anomalies that could encourage phasic discharges within the right temporal lobe and atrophy within the left temporoparietal region) is presented. In addition to interactions between electrical seizures and thinking, she reported a long history of sensed presences, ego-alien intrusions, and "sudden knowing of the subsequent sequences of seizures" before they occurred clinically. The existence of these neurocognitive processes demands a reevaluation of the psychiatric default explanations of "hysteria" and questions the belief that "awareness during seizures" or "premonition of subsequent somatosensory experience" contraindicates an epileptic process.