Can you think like a computer? A critique of artificial "consciousness"

Abstract

This paper argues that the central problem posed by contemporary artificial intelligence is not whether computational systems can reproduce the observable functions of human cognition, but whether their expanding integration into social institutions encourages a reduction of human judgment, creativity, and collective autonomy to measurable and optimizable processes. I address Geoffrey Hinton’s assertion that AI models can obtain consciousness as a starting point for a further investigation of digital barbarism, the trend to imaginatively personify digital applications. Drawing on Thomas Nagel's account of subjective experience and Cornelius Castoriadis' theory of the social imaginary, I develop a critique of algorithmic reductionism that distinguishes the phenomenological limits of computational explanations from the political consequences of deploying AI within corporate and technocratic institutions. I argue that the democratic challenge of AI lies in preserving the capacity of individuals and communities to create new social significations, deliberate about collective ends, and determine the institutional conditions of their technological lives