Non-Biological Concepts of Death
Michael Nair-Collins
A Theory of Death October 1, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/med/9780197613276.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key findings | Reviews two broad families of non-biological accounts of death: "higher-brain theory," which equates death with loss of the capacity for consciousness (via loss of moral status, personhood, personal identity, or the embodied mind), and views holding that death is a social construction or a matter of social, pragmatic, or linguistic decision. The chapter presents arguments for the latter, including that death is a process, a fuzzy set, or a syndrome concept, and draws on theories of reference from philosophy of language. |
Abstract
Abstract: This chapter reviews theories that explain death in non-biological terms, either by invoking the loss of the capacity for consciousness or by arguing that death is a social construction or a matter for social, pragmatic, or linguistic decision. Within the first category, multiple theories are reviewed that rely on the claim that death is loss of moral status, loss of personhood, loss of personal identity, cessation of the embodied mind, and complex combinations thereof. This category is generally known as the higher-brain theory. The second category claims that death is a social construction or in some sense a function of social or linguistic choice and not a biological fact. Arguments reviewed for this claim include that death is a process not an event; that death is a fuzzy set; that death is a syndrome or cluster concept requiring sharpening of the category based on pragmatic concerns; that our concept of death can only be a function of linguistic decision and recommendation, but not reference to an objective reality; and by analogy between death and the concepts of race and sex or gender. Key issues in philosophy of language, specifically theories of reference, are introduced.