Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and the Soul-Womb Analogy: Philosophical Limits of Machine Consciousness in the Yoga Sūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā
Dhananjay Trivedi
Journal of Philosophical Investigations October 29, 2026 DOI: 10.22034/jpiut.2026.71455.4443 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Consciousness Soul ātman Prakṛti-puruṣa Yoga sūtra Bhagavad gītā Soul-womb analogy Ai ethics |
| Key points | Argues that AGI, however sophisticated, cannot possess a soul as defined in the Yoga Sūtra and Bhagavad Gītā, because cognition and adaptive behavior belong to prakṛti and are functional operations, whereas consciousness (puruṣa or ātman) is a witnessing principle irreducible to material or computational processes. The soul-womb analogy illustrates that artificial systems may reproduce cognition without generating conscious subjectivity, and the author cautions against anthropomorphizing AI. |
Abstract
Contemporary discourse on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) increasingly raises questions about machine consciousness, self-awareness, and the possibility of a soul. Although AI systems now exhibit learning, adaptation, and self-modeling, the philosophical status of these capacities remains contested. This paper examines whether AGI can possess a soul by drawing on the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa in the Yoga Sūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā. Within these traditions, cognition and adaptive behavior belong to prakṛti and are functional operations rather than true intelligence, whereas consciousness (puruṣa or ātman) is the witnessing principle irreducible to material or computational processes. Adopting a comparative methodology, the study place’s Indian philosophy in dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind. The soul-womb analogy serves strictly as philosophical illustration, highlighting the difference between creating enabling conditions and generating consciousness itself. Just as a womb provides conditions for embodiment without producing the soul, artificial systems may reproduce cognition without giving rise to conscious subjectivity. The paper argues that AGI, however sophisticated, cannot possess a soul as defined by these texts. It cautions against anthropomorphising artificial systems and reaffirms that moral responsibility remains grounded in human agents, who alone embody both cognition and conscious awareness.
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