Language, Cognition, and Other Ways We Think: Anendophasia and the Functions of Inner Speech

Abstract

Much of our current understanding of inner speech – including much of what is presented in Kompa’s Language, Cognition, and the Way We Think – hinges on it being both pervasive in and important for cognition, with the two often being linked. As the argument goes: if inner speech is ubiquitous, it must be important, and if inner speech is important, everybody must have it. However, the observation that some people experience little to no inner speech makes this foundational notion less solid. Individual differences in inner speech have in recent years come into focus both in the public sphere and in the inner speech research field. While viral posts and clips are generally framed in a sensationalist manner rather than in the spirit of scientific inquiry, the specific perspectives and questions that come up in such public discussions are highly relevant for researchers as well. Scientists and philosophers have studied differences in how people experience “thinking” for a long time (see e.g., Aveling, 1927; Bartlett, 1927; Pear, 1927; Roth, 1965), and a subsection of the inner speech research field is already occupied with describing how the characteristics of inner speech within individuals vary by task demands (Fernyhough, 2004; Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2011; Theodorakis et al., 2000; Yao, 2025). However, trait-level differences in the experience and use of inner speech have received less attention. The finding that some people experience little or even no inner speech deserves attention since, if true, it has serious consequences for theories about the (facilitative and even necessary) role of inner speech in human cognition generally. In this commentary, I will first outline the current evidence for the existence of people with anendophasia, as we have coined the phenomenon in question, and then contextualise anendophasia with regard to some of the functions of inner speech presented in Kompa’s Language, Cognition, and the Way We Think. I will argue that the existence of anendophasia is a serious challenge for theories claiming that consciously experienced inner speech is necessary for metacognition, self-reflection, self-knowledge, and reflexive, higher order, conscious thinking. I will then discuss four possible ways of dealing with this challenge.