Comments on some paradoxes of current perceptual theories
Sergei Gepshtein
Routledge eBooks October 9, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9781351232319-5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that Experimental Phenomenology and philosophical phenomenology share a Brentano-derived origin, and asks whether the heterodox approach blending first-person perspective with third-person natural-science methods is more likely to produce a comprehensive "science of mental phenomena." Proposes replacing an absolute boundary at near-zero visibility with a transitional interval between low and high visibility. |
Abstract
The Experimental phenomenologis origin is the descriptive psychology introduced by Franz Brentano and promulgated by the “Brentano circle” to the threshold of a new approach in the philosophy of mind and a new approach in empirical psychology. This aspiration became figurative in philosophical phenomenology and literal in Experimental Phenomenology, but the common origin left its mark on both disciplines. Researchers interested in the first-person perspective of Experimental Phenomenology increasingly turn to third-person methods of natural science, as is often the case in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. The nature of the paradoxes of Experimental Phenomenology described by Paolo Bozzi raises the questions of whether it is the latter, heterodox approach that is more likely to produce a comprehensive “science of mental phenomena.” An absolute boundary is found where visibility approaches zero. The boundary could be replaced by a transitional interval between low and high visibility.