How Do We Have Feelings?
Irving C. Statler
Journal of Behavioral and Brain Science 2015 DOI: 10.4236/jbbs.2015.511045 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that explanations of consciousness based solely on the electro-mechanical aspects of neuronal activity cannot account for the emergence of experiential consciousness, and proposes that the brain's neurochemistry, a dimension the author says has received little attention, is a likely part of the answer to the "hard problem of consciousness." |
Abstract
For centuries, the question of how a physical structure (the brain) generates the subjective feeling of consciousness has plagued neuroscientists, physiologists, psychologists, linguists, and philosophers. This has become known as the “hard problem of consciousness” and has been the subject of many publications. Although lots of answers have been proposed, none has been completely satisfactory. The focus of most of these studies has been on the neuronal structures and activities. Experiential consciousness emerges from neural processes, but it has not been explained with models that have been based solely on the electro-mechanical aspects of the processes. There must be some other dynamic features of neuronal activity to explain the emergence of experiential consciousness. I argue that a likely answer to the dilemma resides in the added dimension of the neurochemistry of the brain that has, so far, received little attention.