What Is Experience of God? A Hegelian Approach
Sj Terrance Walsh
Toronto Journal of Theology October 1, 2018 DOI: 10.3138/tjt.2018-0105 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Hegel's conception of experience in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) overcomes restrictions Kant's definition of experience as 'empirical knowledge' places on religious experience. Proposes the counterintuitive thesis that a certain way of thinking about the concept of God constitutes experience of God, with the same status as any other experience of knowing: the concept can be thought, evaluated, and be true to itself, to its essence, as a concept. |
Abstract
[Figure: see text] I will consider the problem of the experience of God in light of the fact that God is not present to consciousness as a phenomenal object. I will present Hegel’s conception of experience in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) as a valuable attempt to overcome the restrictions placed upon religious experience by Kant’s definition of experience as “empirical knowledge.” My counterintuitive thesis is that a certain way of thinking about the concept of God constitutes experience of God. Experience of the concept of God has the same status as any other experience of knowing. The concept can be thought and evaluated, and, above all, it can be true—that is, true to itself, to its essence, as a concept.