The barrier for robots
Eugene V. Subbotsky
Routledge eBooks October 4, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9780429490378-4 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that humanlike subjective experience is an exclusive property of living entities and cannot be produced by computers, however powerful. The author contends that neural processes correlate with but do not causally determine subjective experience, that hallucinations and virtual reality are imitations rather than authentic experience, and that subjective experience therefore meets the definition of a "magical phenomenon." |
Abstract
The chapter discusses problems that arise regarding the relationships between artificial intelligence and subjective experience. Could robots be created that possess a humanlike subjective experience? The analysis reveals that even if computer technologies in the future became incommensurably more powerful than the technologies of today, we cannot expect that computers would have humanlike subjective experiences. The reason for this is that subjective experience is an exclusive property of living entities. Subjective experiences closely correlate with neural processes in the brain, yet these processes do not causally determine subjective experiences. Altered states of consciousness, such as artificially induced hallucinations or virtual reality, are imitations of subjective experiences, but not authentic subjective experiences. As long as subjective experience cannot be causally deduced from more general premises, it meets the definition of a magical phenomenon. Neuroscience and cybernetics will create increasingly complex interfaces between intelligent machines and the subjective reality of consciousness, but the gap between artificial intelligence and authentic subjective experiences will never be bridged.