From application to reciprocity: Merleau-Ponty and what it means for physicians to philosophize.
Daisuke Son
Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy October 8, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s11019-026-10406-7 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Philosophy of medicine Medical humanities Physician–patient relationship Merleau-ponty Clinical philosophizing |
| Key points | Argues that "reciprocal clinical philosophizing" is a bidirectional, dialogical practice in which philosophical inquiry and clinical experience mutually generate, constrain, and revise each other's questions. The author contends its novelty lies not in discovering reciprocity but in clarifying its structure and implications for physicians' participation in philosophical inquiry, illustrated through three Merleau-Ponty-derived examples: language and expression, medical objectification, and intersubjectivity. |
Abstract
Philosophy in medicine is often described through application: philosophical concepts are brought to bear on illness, clinical relationships, ethics, or education. Yet this language can obscure forms of inquiry in which clinical experience also reshapes philosophical questions. This paper develops a conceptual account of reciprocal clinical philosophizing: a bidirectional, open-ended, and dialogical practice in which philosophical inquiry and clinical experience can each generate, constrain, and revise questions posed by the other. The argument does not claim that philosophy of medicine has generally been one-way; Canguilhem, phenomenological psychopathology, and contemporary phenomenology of illness already exemplify reciprocal inquiry. Rather, the "application model" is used as an ideal-typical contrast that names a recurrent pressure to make philosophy clinically legible through portable concepts, tools, or measurable outcomes. Three worked examples from Merleau-Ponty-language and expression, medical objectification, and intersubjectivity-show how reciprocity can operate. In each, philosophy unsettles a clinical category while clinical realities, including institutional asymmetry and the necessity of objectification, place pressure back on philosophical interpretation. I argue that the novelty of reciprocal clinical philosophizing lies not in discovering reciprocity, but in clarifying its structure and its implications for how physicians can participate in philosophical inquiry.
Comparable studies
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| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |