Psychophysical parallelism: in the philosophy of G. Deleuze

Abstract

The distinction between the mind and body, their relatedness and respective properties is perhaps the single most persistent problem that faces philosophical contemplation. Various models have been proposed in order to overcome this gaping duality: idealism, occasionalism, epiphenomenalism, behaviourism, etc.. The model proposed within this thesis corresponds to psychophysical parallelism - a parallelism judged purely phenomenological - wherein mind and body are conceived in terms of two aspects of an unconscious transcendental reality. Historically, philosophy has tended to prioritise one of the aspects over the other: Hegel and Marx serve to illustrate this point. As I will argue throughout this thesis, this transcendental reality - within which we will situate spontaneous creativity - is essentially double and subsists between the two extremes. The consequence of this duplicity is to negate the possibility of any reconciliation into an originary Being, but through which the extremes communicate and pass information. Furthermore, since reality is essentially double, we will be at pains to describe it from two perspectives: from the point of view of language and biology, and thereby avoid the tendency to prioritise. The ontological, therefore, will be described in terms of a virtual or potential being situated in neither the heights nor the depths, but staged upon a surface that slips in between the two extremes. This has the added consequence of grounding ethics in sensibility. However, this is not a reductionist programme, but a theory of the whole which functions in the manner of a cybernetic entity constituted upon fractal sedimentations.