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Why a "Digital Soul" Cannot Exist Without a Source: A Critique of Substrate-Independence Theories

Akbarzadeh Alireza

PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) October 15, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23386663 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Addiction
Key points Argues that substrate-independence theories of uploaded consciousness overlook the continuous existential conditions—energy, data, fundamental laws, and control—that consciousness depends on. Proposes "existential source-dependence," holding that consciousness is a source-dependent process rather than a self-sufficient informational pattern or merely a product of a specific kind of matter, and examines consequences for personal identity and the reconstruction thought experiment.

Abstract

This paper offers a fundamental critique of "substrate-independence" theories concerning the "digital soul" and "uploaded consciousness." It argues that these theories often simplify the issue by reducing consciousness primarily to an informational pattern while underemphasizing the continuous existential conditions required for it—namely energy, data, fundamental laws, and control. The paper proposes an alternative framework called "existential source-dependence" and shows that consciousness is neither a self-sufficient pattern nor merely dependent on a particular type of matter, but rather a source-dependent process. The implications of this critique for the problem of personal identity and the reconstruction thought experiment are examined.

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