Skip to content

Obtaining individual narratives and moving to an intersubjective lived-experience description: a way of doing phenomenology

J. Ranse, P. Arbon, Lynette Cusack, R. Shaban, D. Nicholls

February 28, 2020 DOI: 10.1177/1468794120905988 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that phenomenology can be practiced by maintaining orientation to the uniqueness of the "thingness" of phenomena, and proposes a method that moves from individual narrative to an intersubjective description of lived experience, illustrated with exemplars from a doctoral study of Australian nurses after a disaster.

Abstract

In this paper, the authors describe a way of doing phenomenology using exemplars drawn from a doctoral study of Australian nurses’ lived experiences following a disaster. Phenomenology is concerned with the essence of things as they are appearing in the conscious awareness of the first person. This paper emphasises a way of doing phenomenology based on maintaining orientation to the uniqueness of the ‘thingness’ of the phenomena being uncovered. While there is no one way to do phenomenology, this paper shows a way of doing phenomenology from obtaining individual narrative and moving to an intersubjective lived-experience description.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Explore topics