Christian Metaphysics and Human Identity
Angela Franks
Modern Theology August 16, 2026 DOI: 10.1111/moth.70140 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that modern and postmodern rejections of Christian metaphysical concepts such as substance, culminating in Heidegger's dismissal of metaphysical subjectivity, replace being with doing and leave a fractured non-subject. The author contends that the Christian ontology of the person developed in Trinitarian theology and Christology is necessary to safeguard an authentic humanism and personal identity. |
Abstract
Abstract: Since early modernity, thinkers have rejected much of the Christian metaphysical inheritance. Aristotelian substance, for example, was judged to be an empty concept serving little purpose; Locke believed it was empty and unknowable, that which “we know not what, … which we take to be the substratum , or support, of those Ideas we do know.” This rejection was summarized and finalized by Heidegger's sweeping dismissal of metaphysical subjectivity, and post‐modern philosophers unpacked the implications in their proposals of a passive and fractured non‐subject. Yet the substitutes given by modern and postmodern thinkers replace being with doing, in which human beings are marked by consciousness (Locke), autonomous self‐legislating (Kant), or authenticity (Rousseau, and a racially‐coded version with Heidegger). Yet many of these thinkers also wish to retain distinctively Christian and humanistic convictions, such as dignity and political agency. I will argue that the Christian ontology of the person that was developed in the service of Trinitarian theology and Christology is necessary to safeguard an authentic humanism and personal identity.