Wilfrid Sellars’ critique of sense data theories
Shayan Hamraz
Perspectivas August 15, 2026 DOI: 10.20873/rpv11n1-52 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that both of Sellars's critiques of sense-datum theory in the first part of 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' contain multiple flaws. The author contends that Sellars overlooked a possible logical alternative, misinterpreted Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance,' miscategorized sense-datum theory under 'the Myth of the Given,' and wrongly presumed the theory must endorse all six propositions he listed and that sense contents cannot justify beliefs without implicating them. |
Abstract
Sellars criticized the sense-datum theory as a form of 'the Myth of the Given' in the first and second parts of his article 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. In the present article, only his criticisms in the first part have been examined. He presented two critiques of sense data theory. At the end, I have concluded that both of his criticisms contain multiple flaws. He overlooked one possible logical alternative, misinterpreted Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance', categorized sense-datum theory under the Myth of the Given, and erroneously presumed that this theory must endorse all six propositions he listed and that sense contents cannot justify beliefs without implicating them. His objections ultimately lack the force he claims.