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Memory Manipulation, Consciousness, and the Hypothesis of Transmigration From Optogenetic Engrams to the Philosophical Problem of Samsara

Martín Fuertes Oliva

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) October 13, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23340342 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points Argues that experimental modification of memory does not, by itself, establish that consciousness can exist independently of the brain or transmigrate between organisms. Proposes that distinguishing memory, personal identity, and phenomenal consciousness offers a framework for asking whether continuity of experience could be conceived independently of continuity of autobiographical information, and identifies conceptual and evidential conditions such an account would need to satisfy.

Abstract

Recent advances in neuroscience have demonstrated that specific neuralcircuits associated with memory can be experimentally activated, inhibited,and modified through techniques such as optogenetics. Research on memoryengrams has shown that the manipulation of selected neuronal populations canalter the retrieval and behavioral expression of memories, raising fundamentalquestions about the relationship between biological memory, personal identity,and conscious experience.This article examines the conceptual implications of these findings for thedistinction between autobiographical memory and consciousness. It then developsa speculative philosophical hypothesis concerning the possibility of consciouscontinuity without the preservation of personal memories, drawing a conceptualcomparison with the notion of samsara in Indian philosophical and religioustraditions.The central argument is that the experimental modification of memory doesnot, by itself, establish that consciousness can exist independently of the brain ortransmigrate between organisms. Nevertheless, distinguishing memory, personalidentity, and phenomenal consciousness provides a framework for examiningwhether continuity of experience could be conceived independently of continuityof autobiographical information.The hypothesis is evaluated in terms of its conceptual coherence, empiricallimitations, and potential testability. Throughout the discussion, establishedneuroscientific findings are distinguished from philosophical interpretation andconjecture. The aim is not to demonstrate the existence of reincarnation, but toidentify the conceptual and evidential conditions that any scientifically meaningfulaccount of conscious transmigration would need to satisfy.