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From Introspection to Micro-Phenomenology

Claire Petitmengin

Routledge eBooks May 22, 2026 DOI: 10.4324/9781003393269-25 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that micro-phenomenology enables rigorous description of unrecognized dimensions of lived experience and detection of generic experiential structures. Proposes a performative view of the reliability of such descriptions, based on assessing the acts that enable awareness, and contends that becoming aware induces a "subtilization" of structures usually deemed essential, including the inner/outer divide, so that "introspection" is an inappropriate label.

Abstract

This chapter aims at presenting micro-phenomenology, a concrete “introspective” method enabling us to become aware of usually unrecognized dimensions of our lived experience, to describe them with rigor and precision, and to detect possible generic experiential structures. After a description of its origins, the chapter presents the devices used by the method to elicit the process of becoming aware of one&s;s experience by releasing the absorption into its object. Then, it draws the epistemological implications of this process and its ontological implications. On the epistemological side, it advocates a performative view of the reliability of micro-phenomenological descriptions, based on the assessment of the acts that enable one to become aware. On the ontological level, the chapter shows that the process of becoming aware, by releasing the absorption into the object of experience, induces a “subtilization” of the structures we usually consider as essential to our experience, in particular the separation between an “inner” and an “outer” world, which makes the term “introspection” inappropriate to describe this process.

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