Cognition in Practical Activity: Connecting Performativist STS and Radical Enactivism

Abstract

Abstract In Science and Technology Studies (STS), performativism is a research strand which in focusing on the interrelation between human activity and technology use seems to share certain basic affinities with Radical Enactivism (REC) that emphasizes the embodied, non-representational and world-involving nature of cognition. Yet, the connection between the two has not been thematically explored. In this paper, I argue that performativist STS and REC are compatible insofar as performativist accounts of human-technology interaction already presuppose a relational, anti-representational ontology of practice, which REC can further articulate in cognitive terms. I first explore key claims of performativism, particularly its stance on agency and materiality, and then turn to REC to highlight its view on cognition as extensive and grounded in real-world practices. Finally, I argue that while performativism tends to avoid cognitive labels, its focus on performances provides a constructive point of departure for integrating insights from REC, leading to a more nuanced understanding of how cognition and materiality co-constitute human praxis. This paper thus contributes to a dialogue that situates REC as a conceptual resource for articulating cognition within performativist accounts of technology-use in practice.