Representations of mind: C. S. Sherrington and scientific opinion, c. 1930-1950.
R Smith
Science in context December 1, 2001 DOI: 10.1017/s0269889701000230 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Historical analysis Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Brain Neurosciences History, 19th century History, 20th century United kingdom |
| Key points | Argues that C. S. Sherrington's mind-body position was highly qualified and is misrepresented by modern writers as a sterile dualism, and that British mind-body debates of the 1930s and 1940s were ancillary to cultural-value disputes, with dualism defending a threatened conservative culture. Contends that dismissing these scientists' supposed dualism obscures the tension between their defense of mind-associated values and their hope for an integrated mind-body science. |
Abstract
Recent writers in the brain sciences and the philosophy of mind contrast modern biological theories of consciousness with a mind-body dualism supposedly dominant half-a-century ago which they regard as scientifically sterile. Reference to C. S. Sherrington often signals the rejected dualism. This paper re-examines Sherrington's highly qualified position and links it to the arguments of British scientists for whom he was a figurehead in the 1930s and 1940s. I interpret the mind-body literature as ancillary to debates about cultural values. From this perspective, dualism represents a defense of a threatened conservative culture. Dismissal of scientists' supposed "dualism" does little to illuminate the tension in their thought between defense of values traditionally associated with mind and hope for an integrated mind-body science. This leads to comments on Sherrington's own concept of integration. The conclusion relates these points to the new research in the brain sciences evident by the end of the 1940s.