Cerebellum and cognition: viewed from philosophy of mind.
M Frings, M Maschke, D Timmann
Cerebellum 2007 DOI: 10.1080/14734220701200063 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | The author reports finding no support for functionalism from cerebellar research after weighing classical arguments such as multiple realizability, the Chinese room, and the explanatory gap. The author further argues that the explanatory gap provides little support for reducing the phenomenal experience of altered emotion to dysmetria of movement, and urges caution in using the phrases "cognitive dysmetria" and "dysmetria of thought" in the context of mental illness. |
Abstract
Traditionally, it is believed, that the primary function of the cerebellum is to coordinate movement. During the past three decades, it has been controversially discussed, whether the cerebellum may also contribute to cognition and mental states like emotions. In this paper, no position relating to this controversy will be taken. Instead, the hypothesis of non-motor functions of the cerebellum will be viewed from the position of the philosophy of mind. The remarkably uniform microscopic structure and neuronal networks of the cerebellum have led to computer analogies by several authors. The main idea of functionalism, i.e., a theory within the philosophy of mind, is that the mental relates to the physical as computer software does to hardware. This raises the question, whether a cerebellar contribution to cognition and mental states would support functionalism in the philosophy of mind. No support of functionalism could be found in this study, investigating the classical philosophical arguments pro and con functionalism such as those of multiple realizability, the Chinese room and the explanatory gap, while taking the results of cerebellar research into account. On the other hand, philosophical reflection suggests a careful use of the phrases "cognitive dysmetria" (Andreasen et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 1996;93:9985-90) in the context of mental illness and of "dysmetria of thought" (Schmahmann Arch Neurol. 1991;48:1178-87). According to the argument of the explanatory gap there is at present little support for the assumption that the phenomenal experiencing of an altered emotion can be reduced to the dysmetria of movement.
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