What psychology means to me.
Donelson E Dulany
Mens Sana Monographs January 2006 DOI: 10.4103/0973-1229.27604 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Awareness Behaviorism Cognitivism Consciousness Mentalism Unconscious Volition |
| Key points | Argues that consciousness, symbolic representation, and volition are central to understanding mental activity and action, and proposes a mentalistic metatheory that gives consciousness a significant role, drawing on the author's experimental work on intentional action, causal reasoning, and explicit and implicit learning. |
Abstract
What the title of this article means to me after decades on a university faculty is very broad. It would include topics of my research and writing, of my graduate and undergraduate teaching, and of what I read in the area, including papers that have been submitted to me as editor of the American Journal of Psychology. What I can write here focuses on my research and writing and related metatheoretical views, including what I have considered the deeper and more significant questions formulated in philosophy of mind and submitted to empirical investigation in psychology. Of most active concern today, and over the years, are those asking about the roles of consciousness, symbolic representation, and volition in mental activity and action. Is symbolic representation carried out consciously or unconsciously, or both? This paper recognizes the 19(th) century attempt to establish a science of consciousness, a behavioristic movement that rejected consciousness as being the soul of theology, a cognitive metatheory giving some place to consciousness but emphasizing non-conscious symbolic representation. This summarizes our experimental examinations of my theories of the source of intentional action, of causal reasoning, and of explicit and implicit learning. It also summarizes the overarching mentalistic metatheory I have described.