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śāntaraks.ita’s Tattvasam. Graha A Buddhist Critique of the Nyāya View of the Self

Matthew T Kapstein

Buddhist Philosophy April 21, 2009 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195328165.003.0029 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Buddhism
Key points Argues that the most ancient discourses attributed to the Buddha call into question the idea of a unique, persisting self (ātman), and that Abhidharma thinkers held living beings to be aggregations of material atoms and momentary psychic and physical phenomena (dharmas), so that minds are only collections of discrete mental events or acts of consciousness.

Abstract

Abstract: Despite current uncertainties among scholars concerning the “original doctrines” of Buddhism, some of the most ancient among the discourses attributed to the Buddha unmistakably call into question the notion that each one of us possesses a unique and persisting self, or ātman in Sanskrit. In developing this idea, the early Buddhist thinkers who composed the several versions of the Abhidharma (the “metadoctrine”) held living beings to be aggregations of primitive, unitary substances, that is, material atoms and substantial, but momentary, psychic and physical phenomena (dharma).Thus, when we speak of minds, we speak only of collections of discrete mental events, or acts of consciousness.

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