Clinical cognition and embodiment.
John Paley
International Journal of Nursing Studies January 2004 DOI: 10.1016/s0020-7489(03)00081-6 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that nursing literature wrongly conflates two distinct distinctions - Cartesian versus embodied cognition and calculative rationality versus intuitive know-how - into an opposition between 'Cartesian rationality' and 'embodied know-how'. Contends that embodied knowing is frequently rational, and that separating embodied cognition from non-rational intuition leads to concepts of distributed cognition and distributed expertise, with important implications for understanding clinical cognition in nursing. |
Abstract
I first identify two different distinctions: between Cartesian cognition and embodied cognition, and between calculative rationality and intuitive know-how. I then suggest that, in the nursing literature, these two distinctions are run together, to create an opposition between 'Cartesian rationality' and 'embodied know-how'. However, it is vital to keep the two distinctions apart, because 'embodied knowing' is very frequently rational. In separating the idea of embodied cognition from non-rational intuition, I show how 'embodiment' leads to the concepts of distributed cognition and distributed expertise. This has extensive and important implications for how we understand clinical cognition in nursing.