Embodiment, language, and mimesis
September 17, 2007 DOI: 10.1515/9783110207507.3.297 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 170 |
| Key points | Argues that embodiment theories, especially Lakoff and Johnson's, cannot adequately account for language because they neglect convention, norms, representation, and consciousness. Proposes the notion of "mimetic schema" as a way to bridge individual bodily experience and collective language. |
Abstract
For years now, leading representatives of theoretical linguistics have been arguing that humans, being gov-erned by a blind ‘language instinct’, can be exhaus-tively described in physico-biological terms. … [T]his conception has been shown to be fundamentally false. Humans are also, and crucially, social, normative, and conscious beings, occasionally capable of acts of free will. Esa Itkonen, What is Language? The present focus on embodiment in cognitive science undervalues con-cepts such as convention/norm, representation and consciousness. I argue that these concepts constitute essential properties of language, and this makes it problematic for “embodiment theories ” to account for human lan-guage and cognition. These difficulties are illustrated by examining a par-ticular, highly influential approach to embodied cognition, that of Lakoff and Johnson (1999), and exposing the problematic character of the notion of the “cognitive unconscious”. To attempt a reconciliation between em-bodiment and language, I turn to the concept of (bodily) mimesis, and pro-pose the notion of mimetic schema as a mediator between the individual human body and collective language. 1.