Orí and the localization of consciousness: A relational reading of Ifá after the defundamentalization of spacetime

Abstract

This article proposes a conceptual reconstruction of the Yorùbá principle Orí, not as an ancient theory of consciousness, but as a philosophical operator for the non-spatial localization of a perspective. Once spacetime is defundamentalized as an ontological primitive, localization ceases to be a position in space and becomes instead a restriction of possible relations. Within this framework, Orí is modeled as the principle that constrains the space of possible trajectories of experience and closes a singular perspective, without producing the existence of consciousness itself - a question this program addresses elsewhere. This reading is explicitly restricted to the indexicality of experience, not to resolving the hard problem. The position defended is situated within a three-term typology contrasting Tononi's Integrated Information Theory and Manzotti's mind-object identity theory, and is further distinguished from Kastrup's analytic idealism and Goff's panpsychism. The text explicitly acknowledges a competing naturalistic and organic reading of Orí without refuting it, and defers the question of Orí's own individuation to a companion text on operative closure.