Bases do pensamento fenomenológico e existencial em William James
A. Feijoo
December 1, 2013 DOI: 10.1590/s1414-98932013000400006 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that William James's psychology and existential-phenomenological thought share an attempt to avoid objectifying consciousness, but diverge because James still treats consciousness as an object of psychology while phenomenology and existentialism reject the consciousness-versus-world division; they also disagree on method, clinical practice, and the goals of the clinic. |
Abstract
In this article, our goal is to investigate the foundation and the basis of existential and phenomenological thought of Psychology by William James, regarding the notion of consciousness, method and clinical practice. For both, we analyze some works of James and divide their proposals into three distinct periods: pragmatism, functionalism and empiricism. By means of the elaboration in each of these moments, we try to clarify the points of encounter and the points the confrontation with the existential and phenomenological thought. We conclude that the meeting point concerns the attempt of not objectification of consciousness. Regarding the mismatch, we believe that while James still takes consciousness as object of psychology and that phenomenology and existential perspectives deviate from the idea of object, since they do not consider the consciousness versus the world. Another mismatch is presented in the sharp disagreement between James and the existential and phenomenological thought regarding method and practice as well as the goals of the clinic.